Although idealized calculations of the potential for an atomic explosion within a repository can make headlines, a more technically useful assessment is a systematic, multidisciplinary, integrated analysis that uses a set of consistent assumptions of disposal system performance. The analysis described here, called a performance assessment, employs the same general approach to study the potential of a critical mass assembly as has been used to examine other potentially disruptive scenarios in a nuclear waste disposal system. This report presents one of two approaches-bounding calculations-which were used in a major study in 1994 to examine the possibility of a criticality in a repository. The bounding probabilities in this study are rough and do not entirely dismiss the possibility of a critical condition; however, they do point to the difficulty of creating conditions under which a critical mass could be assembled (i.e., corrosion of containers, separation of neutron absorbers from the fissile material, and collapse or precipitation of the fissile material) and, more important, how significant the geochemical and hydrologic phenomena are in examining this criticality issue. Furthermore, the study could not conceive of a mechanism that was consistent with conditions under which an atomic explosion could occur, i.e., first, the manner in which. fissile material could be collected and, then, how it would be assembled (or diffused outward) within microseconds. In addition, should a criticality occur in or near a container in the future, the bounding consequence calculations in this study showed that fissions from one critical event (<-l&O fissions, if similar to aqueous and metal accidents and experiments) are quite small compared to the amount of fissions represented by the spent nuclear fuel itself. Also, if it is assumed that the containers necessary to hold the highly enriched spent nuclear fuel in this study went critical once per day for 1 million years, creating an energy release of about l02Ofissions, the number of fissions equals about l028, which corresponds to only 1% of the fission inventory in a repository containing 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) (the expected size for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada).
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INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this report is to present bounding calculations as one approach taken to date to explore the potential of a critical configuration developing in or near a container of highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel disposed without treatment directly into an unsaturated volcanic tuff repository. The highly enriched uranium fuel comes from special reactors owned by the U.S. government. Although the initial configuration of the spent fuel will change over time, whether a critical configuration can or will develop is uncertain. Since the publication of articles in The New York Times about Bowman and Venneri's belief that a potential exists for an atomic explosion in a nuclear waste repository (Bowman and Venneri, 1996; Broad, 1995; Taubes, 1995) , several commentators have criticized the Bowman and Vennen calculations and called for a "... probabilistic risk assessment of the hypothesis" (Geppert, 1995) , or stated that a "risk-based analysis of possible scenarios and neutxon transport . . . is needed" (VSUI Konynenburg, 1996) or that a"... systematic and multi-disciplinary approach is recommended . . . based on risk and decision theories" (Paperiello, 1995) . A risk analysis has as its hallmark a balanced, systematic, multidisciplinary, integrated analysis of a technological system to evaluate the potential and consequences of unwanted outcomes. This type of analysis takes into account actual features, events, and processes of the system rather than relying on simplistic calculations of conjectured initial conditions. The remainder of the introduction discusses the risk analysis methodology, previous criticality work, and disposal options for the highly enriched fuel considered herein.
Performance Assessment
The overall risk analysis process for a nuclear waste disposal system is usually called a "performance assessment" (PA). In the United States, a performance assessment is intimately tied to the general scientific process of stochastic modeling. 'l%eanalysis differs in practical details, but its theory is identical to the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) performed for a nuclear reactor, an analysis technique that was developed concurrently with the performance assessment (Rechard, 1995a) . The use of stochastic modeling to incorporate uncertainty in outcomes has, until about 1990, set PAs and PRAs apart from the risk assessment traditionally performed to evaluate chemical toxicity and carcinogenicity. Furthermore, PAs and PRAs have also used more formal methods to construct scenarios-an example of which is shown in this report.
Quantifiable measures from a performance assessment (like a PRA) are derived from am.wers to three questions: What unwanted conditions may occur? What is the probability of each occurrence? What are the consequences of each occurrence (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; ? In a performance assessment, the answer to the first question is generated by characterizing the system and then identifying various scenarios. The scenario discussed in this report is the assembly of a mass of Iissile material in or near a waste container after disposal in a geologic repository such that a critical condition occurs. * The second question is answered by estimating probabilities based on empirical data or modeling the physical processes necessary to assemble a critical mass in various configurations. An important aspect of this step is to establish probable initial conditions. For the criticality issue, the answer to the third question is provided from estimates of consequences based on empirical data.
Previous Work
Because of the general importance of considering criticality scenarios in a risk-based analysis of arty nuclear facility, consideration of criticality scenarios at a nuclear disposal site is not new. For example, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project, which is studying the effects of disposal of waste contaminated with transuranic radionuclides, has included criticali~in its scenarios since 1979 (Bingham and Barr, 1!]80; , and the international community has included it since 1981 in its generic list of events to consider (IAEA, 1981) . Carter (1973) evaluated the potential for criticality as part of a safety analysis of nuclear wnste disposal in trenches at the Hanford site. In 1979, Clayton (1979) suggested a positive feedback mechanism for a critical . .
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In nuclearengineering,a criticalconditionor event(commonlycalled"a criticality")denotesthe assemblyof sufficientfissilemasssuchthat a thresholdis reachedwhereby,over the long term, sufficientneutronsare generatedfrom fissionsto create a self-sustainingnuclearchain reaction and readily generateheat energy. However,the meaningof the word "critical"to people outsidethe nuclear communityis most oftenassociatedwiththe wayit is usedin the medicalfield,thatis, to denotea crisis(actuallythe thresholdof a crisis). As describedfurther in Section5.1.6,for a nuclearcriticalityto becomea "crisis"(i.e.,createan atomicexplosion)the systemmustpass throughthe criticalstate extremelyfast and reach a prompt supercriticatstate wherebythe number of promptneutrons(not includlngdelayed neutrons)increases faster than the fissilematerialcan expandfromthe energyrelease,therebyallowingmassivenumbersof chain carryingneutronsto be produced. Becausethe intendedaudienceof thisreportis outsidethe nuclearcommunity, the phrase"sustainednuclearchainreaction"is occasionallyusedto counteractthe understandablebut mistakentendencyto associatea nuclearcriticalitywith a gravecrisis. event in the trenches at the Hanford site based on the calculations by Carter (1973) . , Stratton (1983 dismissed the allegations that a nuclear explosion had occurred at a waste disposal site in the Ural mountains in Russia. Finally, recent comments on the Bowman calculations have provided qualitative arguments about the difficulty of achieving a critical condition in a repository and the apparent impossibility of an atomic explosion (Van Konynenburg, 1996; Canavan et al., 1995) . The study described in this report differs from these others by using the risk analysis framework to provide a quantitative evaluation of the potential for a criticality scenario including, especially, the chemical and physical phenomena necessary to alter the waste container and the fuel. Although many of the qualitative arguments presented by van Konynenburg (1996) and Canavan et al. (1995) could be placed within this risk framework, this has not been done here.
Disposition Options for Waste Containing Fissile Material (Highly Enriched Spent Nuclear Fuel)
The amount of fissile material (i.e., primarily 233U, 235U, and 239Pu, which are fissioned by slow [thermal] neutrons) in nuclear waste varies from practically none for reprocessed fhel to -2% for commercial spent nuclear fuel to -9070 for weapons-grade plutonium and some highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel before irradiation.
Therefore, the disposition options and implications of developing a criticality vary considerably. This report pertains to the highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel category; however, some of the results qualitatively apply to other waste categories.
Several disposition options exist for the highly enriched spent nuclear fuel, each with a different potential for developing a criticality condition. This report examines direct disposal without treatment. However, prudent design measures are included to preclude a criticality immediately after disposal, such as including boron in stainless steel to absorb neutrons that otherwise could contribute to a nuclear chain reaction and mixing of containers such that containers with highly enriched uranium spent fuel are not placed next to each other. (Previous calculations [Rechard, 1995b] also showed that the mass of the containers was such that if two containers of highly enriched uranium were placed end-toend, the neutron population in one container would not significantly contribute to the neutron population normally present in the other container.) In addition, several design features are included that moderately reduce the probability of a critical condition over the long term: (a) containers with an average long design life are used, (b) containers are spaced close enough so that the heat generated by the decay of radioisotopes heats the rock such that sufficient vaporization occurs in order to keep the containers dry for several hundred years, and (c) the repository is located in an unsaturated zone of volcanic tuff similar to that proposed for commercial, low enriched spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Because decisions on construction and packaging of the containers for highly enriched fuel are not final, many options for preventing a criticality with moderate or high assurance are available for consideration. Other moderate assurance measures that have been considered, but are not discussed further here, include (1) using neutron poisons with similar geochemical behavior to that of the geologic setting of the repository, (2) limiting fissile mass in each individual container, (3) using a salt repository, and (4) use of naturally occurring phosphate minerals with adsorbed rare earth metals. Rechard (1993) reports on the impact to the disposal system of the moderate assurance measure of limiting fissile mass in each container and the use of a salt repository. Within the salt, the likelihood of a criticality is practically zero; hence, a criticality can occur only outside the salt mass which, as shown in Rechard (1993) and elsewhere WIPP PA Department, 1992) , requires a human intrusion. The fourth option, using phosphates mixed with rare earth metals (i.e., naturally occurring apatite) outside the container to greatly reduce the mobility of actinides and, simultaneously, to prevent a criticality, has been only proposed.
High assurance measures for preventing a critical condition that have been or will be considered, but are not discussed further here, include (1) surface storage of the spent fuel assemblies; (2) reprocessing and reuse of the fissile material in a nuclear reactor, or transmutation in a neutron flux generated by either a nuclear reactor or particle accelerator and (3) mixing of the spent fuel with depleted uranium. While the first option certainly precludes a criticality in the geologic repository, it requires active institutional control on the surface to prevent accidental and terrorist-caused criticalities and dispersal of the tissile material. Rechard (1993) reports on the uses of the high assurance measures of removing all fissile material from the spent fuel and then using the fissile material elsewhere, or mixing the fuel with depleted or natural uranium. As discussed by Rechard (1993) , a negative impact of the latter option is the increased number of containers required, but a positive benefit (besides providing a greater assurance of preventing a criticality) is the disposal of stockpiles of depleted uranium.
In summary, several options exist for providing moderate to high assurance of preventing a criticality during disposal of large masses of fissile material. In this report, one technique, berated stainless steel, for preventing a criticality in the short term (i.e., storage, transportation, and operational phase of the repository) is considered. If other engineered features are eventually adopted to prevent a criticality over the long term, the arguments presented here will continue to be useful for conveying the level of assurance that the disposal system can provide.
Analysis Overview
In the following description of the analysis, possible regulatory criteria regarding a criticality are first mentioned briefly, and then the discussion is organized around answers to the three questions of a performance assessment (1) system characterization and scenarios, (2) probability and process of assembling the fissile material into a configuration that promotes a nuclear chain reaction, and (3) consequences of the continued or cyclic operation of a nuclear chain reaction within the fissile mass assembly. Although neither the assembly process nor its consequences could be explored completely within the time available for the study on which this report is based (Rechard, 1995b) , both aspects were investigated because of their interrelationship. A useful analysis requires that consistency be maintained between these two aspects (i.e., the processes that assemble the fissile mass establish the initial conditions under which a nuclear reaction would operate). Fttrthermore, because current regulations lack specific guidance on criticality issues over the long term, the assembly and operation of the fissile mass (items 2 and 3 above) were studied here through bounding calculations. The bounding calculations on the probability and consequences of a critical condition in a geologic repository are presented in this report in order to provide alternatives for (1) rational policy decisions concerning criticality and (2) procedures for examining the possibility of a criticality in a repository.
REGULATORY SETTING
Although a risk-based analysis is not limited to developing metrics for comparison with regulatory criteria, the regulations do establish important criteria and an accepted modeling style. Several laws and regulations affect the disposal of radioactive waste in geologic repositories.
Policy Laws
Three laws of particuku-importance with regard to defining policy are the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, 1983) , subsequent amendments to this act in 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) , and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Energy Policy Act, 1992) . Although the NWPA of 1982 and the NWPAA of 1987 do not establish performance criteria for a repository, they d[o establish the policy that the current generation is obliged to bear the political and financial costs of developing a permanent disposal option. A specific requirement c)fthis policy in NWPA of 1982 is that U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense and experimental waste, with the exception of transuranic defense waste, should be disposed of with commercial nuclear waste and thus must comply with all requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
In 1985, in accordance with suggestions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and after study of the issue, President Reagan concurred that the DOE highlevel waste (waste ffom reprocessing spent fuel) be placed in the same repository as commercial spent nuclear fuel. Disposal options for the direct disposal of DOE spent nuclear fuel were not explicitly studied for some time because it was implicitly assumed that the fuel would be reprocessed to extract the highly enriched uranium (235U) or fissile plutonium (2391%). However, in 1992, the U.S. government established a policy to end all reprocessing of DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel except in special circumstances. Hence, disposal of the spent nuclear fuel without reprocessing might be necessary, and therefore a need existed to study the impact on the repository of its disposal. One such impact was the criticality issue, which is reported here.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 set a new policy that is expected to generate substantial changes in the regulatory setting. Generally, the act requires that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seek advice from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to promulgate a site-specific standard for the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and a revision of the NRC regulation to agree with the new EPA standard. The NAS issued its recommendations (NAS, 1995) after this study was completed; three suggestions that will affect future studies are that (1) the maximum annual effective dose equivalents be used as the criteria for protecting public health, (2) the maximum annual effective dose equivalent be determined over a million year period, and (3) the probability of an inadvertent human intrusion event not be formally estimated, instead only potential consequences of a few selected situations would be evaluated. The influence of these recommendations on the present study are qualitatively noted.
Regulations
As noted above, the regulations for geologic disposal are in flux. However, current regulations are discussed here briefly because they represent the only guidance at present.
40 CFR 191
In 1985 (EPA, 1985) , which had been under study since 1977. The regulation was remanded shortly thereafter but repromulgated with only minor changes in 1993 (EPA, 1993) . The EPA standard, 40 CFR 191, establishes criteria for the disposal system as a whole. One criterion in 40 CFR 191, the Containment Requirements, requires an analysis to evaluate probabilities of integrated release at the disposal system boundary for 10,000 yr and compare results against the probabilistic criterion in these requirements.
10 CFR 60
The NRC is responsible for ensuring that a disposal system for commercially generated spent fuel meets the requirements of EPAs 40 CFR 191. Prior to promulgation of 40 CFR 191, but cognizant of its likely contents, the NRC promulgated in 1983 the technical criteria to be used in evaluating a geologic repository and thus implementing 40 CFR 191 as "Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories;' Code of Federal Regulations 10, Part 60. The technical criteria established minimum requirements for subsystems of the disposal system (thereby treating the disposal system like a nuclear reactor). The requirements are stringent: a 300-to 1000-yr period for substantially complete containment of radionuclides by the waste containe~and a maximum engineered barrier fractional release rate of 10-5/yr of the 1000-yr inventory for any radionuclide released at a rate greater than 0.170 of the calculated total release rate of all radionuclides. In addition, 10 CFR 60 flatly prohibits explosive, pyrophonc, and chemically reactive material and free liquids and also requires solidification of all radioactive waste, consolidation of particulate, and reduction of combustible radioactive waste forms to noncombustible forms. Provided these criteria on subsystems remain in the revised 10 CFR 60, they might have been used to form the basis for setting initial conditions for a criticality analysis. Because of anticipated changes to 10 CFR 60, however, herein they are used only as a means of comparing calculated performance in the original study (Rechard, 1995b) .
2.2.3
Criticality 40 CFR 191 lacks specific guidance regarding the occurrence of a criticality after closure of the repository. The only mention of a criticality is in 10 CFR Part 60, Section 60.131, "General design criteria for the geologic repository operations area" (emphasis added), where geologic repository operations area means "a high-level radioactive waste facility that is part of a geologic repository, including both surface and subsurface areas, where waste handling activities are conducted" (emphasis added). For the operational phase of the repository, paragraph (b)(7) of this section adopts standard criticality control similar to nuclear power plants, statingz "all systems for processing, transporting, handling, storage, retrieval, emplacement, and isolation of radioactive waste shall be designed to ensure that a nuclear criticality accident is not possible unless at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent or sequential changes have occurred in the conditions essential to nuclear criticality safety . . . ."
Although the current regulations lack either specific guidance or provide guidance that would be difficult to apply to the post-closure phase regarding the acceptability of a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, the risks associated with a critical condition still must be evaluated under the general provisions of the regulations.
NPE OF NUCLEAR WASTE AND DISPOSAL SYSTEM STUDIED
It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a complete description of the system. Only a few parameters are mentioned in this report to provide the reader a measure of understanding of some facets of the disposal system and the bounding arguments presented.
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Althoughthis sectionof 10CFR60 is describingthe operationalphaseof the repository,the word "isolation"is used. As definedby 10CFR 60, "isolation"means"inhibitingthe transportof radioactivematerialso that amountsand concentrationsof this materiafenteringthe accessible environmentwill be keptwithinprescribedlimits." Becauseof this ambiguityand the potentiatdhlicultyof applyingstandardcnticatity controlto the post-closurephase of an undergroundrepository,the authorsanticipatethat when 10 CFR 60 is modifiedin the future the NRC will clarifyeitherthe type of cnticafi~controlor the criticalitycalculationsnecessaryfor the post-closureevaluation.
The nuclear waste considered in this study is spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste owned by the DOE. Of primary interest in this study is the potential for the .
highly enriched spent nuclear fuel to assemble into a critical mass. Although various disposal options are possible, the option studied here is direct disposal in an unsaturated volcanic tuff repository similar to the pro-.
posed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as mentioned earlier.
Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel
Although the majority of spent fuel by volume and mass is produced commercially by nuclear power plants, the DOE has about 1400 m3 or 2700 metric tonnes of uranium (heavy metal) (MTHM) of spent I%el for disposal (DOE, 1994) . Of this spent fiel, about 210 MTHM (8%) was originally highly enriched (i.e., the mass of fissile uranium isotope 235U is >20%). The many types of highly enriched fuel were placed in three categories for this study (Table I) : (1) graphite spent fuel (28 MTHM in 83 containers), (2) a chemically reactive highly enriched spent fuel (72 MTHM in 33 containers), and (3) a robust highly enriched spent fuel(110 MTHM in 256 containers).
The graphite fuel was represented by the Fort St. Vrain (Colorado) reactor fuel, consisting of uranium and thorium carbide fuel particles coated with silicon carbide in a graphite matrix. The inventory includes radionuclides horn the Peach Bottom 1 (Pennsylvania) reactor fuel. Uranium-aluminum metal alloy advanced test reactor (AR) fuel with aluminum cladding represented the chemically reactive spent fuel category, because ATR is a plurality among this type of fuel and also is one of the most chemically reactive highly enriched spent fuels. Some of the Am fuel has been damaged from corrosion during storage in the water basin and thus may be treated before disposal by placement in stainless steel capsules to guard against creating conditions conducive to a rapid chemical oxidation of the uranium metal or a criticality during storage and transportation. The zircaloy-clad, uranium-dioxide Shippingport fuel represented the robust highly enriched fuel category. The inventory of the fuel from the Navy propulsion reactors is included in this category.
Other Nuclear Waste Included in Study
In addition to the 210 MTHM of highly enriched uranium spent fuel in 372 containers, the hypothetical repository under study included (1) 2262 MTHM of low-enriched pressurized water reactor (I?WR) fuel and weapons-production fuel in 95 containers; (2) 320 MTHM (equivalents) of high-level calcine waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in 296 containers (original study used 2037 containers); and (3) 9268 MTHM (equivalents) of high-level sludge waste from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel within the DOE complex (Table I) in 1880 containers. Although this waste is important with regard to other aspects of the original study, for the purposes of this report, the addition of this waste can be viewed primarily as permitting an examination of the influence of highly enriched uranium fuel in a moderately sized repository.
Nuclear Waste Not Included in Study
Five categories of spent nuclear fuel were not included in this study. First, although up to 70,000 MTHM of commercial spent nuclear fuel would possibly be present in the repository (NWPA, 1983) , it was not included in the original study because, if it were, the DOE highly enriched spent nuclear fuel would represent only about 0.370 of the mass and it would be difficult to assess its influence on repository performance in an initial study. Future studies can remove this type of conservatism if warranted. Second, sufficient information about foreign spent fuel was not available in time to include in this study, which was performed in fiscal year 1994. This DOE-owned spent fuel is similai to the Am fuel but was used in foreign reactors and was shipped (prior to 1986) to Savannah River Plant, South Carolina, for storage (and, beginning this year, will again be shipped there). Third, high-level waste from the singleshelled tanks at the Hanford was not included, because the inventory was not available. Fourth, potential highlevel nuclear waste from decontaminaticm and destruction of DOE facilities was not includeti. Finally, the more than 50 MTHM of plutonium and hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium that will become surplus as U.S. nuclear weapons are dismantled as the result of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) and unilateral pledges (NAS, 1994, p. 1) was not included. The weapons uranium is generally not contaminated with fission products (unlike the highly enriched uranium discussed in this report), and so it can be blended with depleted uranium to produce standard low-enriched fuel for commercial reactors. The more important question is the disposition of the excess 239Pu. The NAS has recommended exploring three options for its disposal; all three ultimately involve geologic disposal, but two options involve direct disposal either by vitrification in borosilicate glass and then disposal in a commercial . repository or emplacement in very deep boreholes in granite without first consuming 239Pu in a commercial reactor. Evaluating the criticality concerns of these , options was beyond the scope of this report but could involve arguments similar to those reported here except that plutonium will be substituted for uranium. (The discussion presented here would apply directly if the containers, waste matrix, and lower volubility of 239Pu delay release assembly until it decays to 235U,as is considered likely at Yucca Mountain.)
Containers
For the arguments presented, the container for the highly enriched fuel was a multi-purpose canister of 304L stainless steel, 25.4 mm thick, 5.14 m long, and 1.77 m in diameter. This handling canister was then assumed to be overpacked with a 20-mrn-thick corrosion-resistant material (Incoloy 825) and a 100-mmthick corrosion-allowance material (i.e., ASTM Type A-516, Grade 60 carbon steel) (Fig, 1) . To preclude criticalities even when voids in an intact container are fully filled with water, the container design was assumed to use berated stainless steel neutron absorber as the support structure for the spent nuclear fuel.
The corrosion rate of these protective materials in the container is a strong function of the concentration of oxygen, water saturation, and temperature. The simulation in the original study (Rechard, 1995b) , accounts for this functional dependence; here, however, the distribution of rates at oxic conditions, 26°C (ambient) and 100"C, at 100% saturation, are presented for use in the bounding calculations (Fig. 2) .
Repository Layout and Waste Emplacement
The engineered barriers consist of the humandesign elements that are intended to isolate the waste from the accessible environment. Two design components are the waste form itself and the containers (discussed above). Components of the engineered barriers that are specific to the repository include (1) the subsurface facility layout, (2) the design for waste emplacement, and (3) any specially prepared backfill (a subset of which is often called a "seal") in the drifts and ramps. Many precise details of the repository-such as the need for ramps or ventilation, and the size of the operational area-depend more on the operational phase of the repository than behavior after closure. Thus, this discussion highlights only the dimensions considered pertinent to post-closure behavior, such as the minimum spacing of containers and rooms. Rechard, 1995b, Figure ES-4) .
The disposal region of the repository was sized to accommodate 12,060 MTHM of spent fuel or equivalent high-level waste. The mine design consists of long rooms ("tunnels"), 7.65 m in diameter, that are surrounded by and connected to access drifts, which are in turn connected to ramps that lead to the surface (Fig. 3) .
The large waste containers are assumed to be transported to and within the repository by rail and then Kirby, 1979, and Soo, 1984 ; localized corrosion data for Incoloy from Wilson et al., 1994, Table 13-5 ; generalized data for stainless steelfiom i14cCright et al., 1987..) parked horizontally, end to end with no gap, in the tunnels for disposal. The tunnels were spaced 4.3 m apart (8.6 m between tunnel centers). This spacing resulted in an areal power density of 23.5 W/m2 for the nuclear waste if it is placed in the year 2030. The containers are closely packed ("hot" repository concept) to ensure the absence of water in the majority of the repository for a number of years. Backfill was placed only in the drifts and ramps; no baclcfdl was placed around the containers in the rooms. (For modeling [Rechard, 1995b] , this void was added to the porosity of a numerical mesh element containing the waste parcel.) At emplacement, neutron interaction between containers does not occur because sufficient material exists at the ends of the container. Furthermore, in simulations (Rechard, 1995b) , the highly enriched spent nuclear fuel containers were assumed to be uniformly mixed with the other nuclear waste included in the study and placed throughout the entire repository.
Unsaturated, Volcanic Tuff Geologic Barrier
The geologic barrier isolates the repository from the accessible environment. The general technical criterion for a geologic barrier is an ability to physically isolate radionuclides from the biosphere or, for regulatory purposes, the accessible environment; 40 CFR 191 defines the accessible environment as any location (including the surface and subsurface) that is 5 km from the repository. The geologic barrier that is discussed comprises a sequence of tuff (formed from welding of hot volcanic ash as it is deposited from a volcanic eruption) at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, located in a basin and range topographical province. General advantages of tuff as a geologic barrier are that it readily adsorbs many radionuclides and that groundwater becomes saturated with silica, which reduces the volubility of radionuclides. Advantages of this particular tuff are that it is located relatively near the surface in areas remote from human populations. Also, because the tuff deposit is located in a semi-arid climate, the repository can reside in the large unsaturated zone, which limits the amount of water that can degrade containers and transport radionuclides to the accessible environment. The advantage of limited water in the unsaturated zone may be offset somewhat by the potential of being an oxic environment, which can promote higher corrosion rates and radionuclide solubilities; however, as seen in preliminary simulations (to be discussed in a future report), the large amounts of iron in the container considered herein greatly reduce the amount of oxygen available for tens of thousands of years.
Frequently in simulations (e.g., Rechard, 1995b) , the stratigraphy of the tuff disposal system is idealized as a series of constant thickness hydrologic modeling units ("pancakes") with a dip of 4.6°. The modeling units consist of consecutive layers of tuff with degrees of porosity that are similar, based on three wells near Yucca Mountain, USW GU-3/G-3, USW G-4, and UZ-16. Although the modeling units roughly correspond to the formal geologic stratigraphy, some units contain only a portion of a formation member or overlay several formation members, Herein, the repository is assumed to be placed 286 m below the surface and 333 m above an aquifer. The current saturation of the volcanic tuff is about 65'70 (Fig. 4) . The average intact matrix porosity of the 333-m-thick tuff surrounding the repository (TS modeling units) is -0.14 (Wilson et al., 1994, Table 7-3) . The average matrix porosity of the entire column of tuff used in the study is -0.19 ( Fig.  4) (Rautman, 1995) . Although not apparent from the coarse porosity data shown in Fig. 4 , the average and Rechard, 1995b, Figure ES-8.) . ( 
Layout of waste disposal rooms and access drips in volcanic tuff for hypothetical repository containing DOE spent jhel and high-level waste (after

ANALYSIS APPROACH AND SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
Analysis Approach
In analyzing the risk of a critical condition developing after emplacement, two approaches were used. The first approach assumed that a critical condition would develop and investigated the consequences. The critical condition was treated as an event, and scenarios were developed that contained this event. However this approach, which was pursued in response to interest in the consequences of such an event, required that a probability be assigned to the critical event. The probabilities and consequences of scenarios (features, events, and processes of likely interest) are evaluated to determine whether the scenario should be considered. A small probability or consequence can be used {asthe basis for removing the scenario from consideration. For systems that are still being characterized and thus are not well understood, however, such an evaluation may give overly pessimistic results which, while useful for relative comparisons of similar systems, are suspect for evaluating absolute probabilities. In evaluating the probabilities and consequences, a pwosely imposed constraint was to avoid the use of detailed simulations and, instead, to use general scientific knowledge and natural analogues as information sources. (ajler Rautman, 1995, Figure 8, and Rechard, 1995b, Figure ES-10) .
Original study (Rechard, 1995b) used 11 modeling units; here the modeling unit containing the repository has been subdivided.
The second approach was to fully simulate the evolution of the disposal system as the container degrades to monitor whether conditions exist under which a criticality could occur. The second approach evaluates a critical condition by examining the natural phenomena that may promote it. This approach permits a better but not complete understanding of the phenomena necessary to promote a nuclear chain reaction in a repository and the likely initial and boundary conditions for a critical event. Although fascinating, a drawback is that the modeling (i.e., Rechard, 1995b ) is complex and thus difficult to convey in a report such as this, which is primarily devoted to emphasizing the analysis approach taken. In the following sections, this report describes both the difficulties encountered in evaluating a probability of a criticality event for the first approach, and the success of bounding the consequences (Fig. 5 ).
Scenario Development with Criticality as an Event
Scenario development is the second phase of model development (the first, disposal system characterization, has already been discussed) and is the general process of deciding what may happen to the disposal system in the future and how to model it. In conjunction with system characterization, the scenario development process establishes how the real world will be represented by conceptual model(s). Although not often a separate task in the analysis of small systems, in the analysis of a large, complex disposal system it is impotiant to treat this part of model development (even though it is mostly a heuristic process) as a distinct analysis task consisting of the following general steps (Rechard, 1995a) : (1) Identifying and listing the universe of features, events, and processes of the disposal system, where events are short-term phenomena and processes are long-term phenomenw (2) selecting those features, events, and processes to model including those elements that have a high probability of occurrence and are likely to contribute to unwanted consequences, while omitting those elements that (a) have exc~edingly low probabilt ies of occurrence, (b) lead to exceedingly low consequences, or (c) have no role in calculations based on regulatory guidance; (3) grouping those features, events, and processes into summary scenarios; (4) creating conceptual models of the disposal system based on system characterization and incorporating the retained elements; and (5) designing performance assessment calculations based on the conceptual models.
In the present study, three events were judged to be important in summary scenarios for the first 10,000b asaltic volcanism (V); human intrusion by exploratory drilling (Ho; and criticality (C) (Fig. 6 ). All other events, processes, and features were treated as either certainties or impossibilities. (A description of the features and processes included in the analysis is presented in Rechard, 1995b .) The elementary probability of basaltic volcanism near Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in the first 10,000 yr was conservatively taken as -2.4 x 10-4 (Barnard et al., 1992, pp. 7-5 to 7-7) . The elementary probability of at least one inadvertent human intrusion in the first 10,000 yr was taken as -5.6x 10-2. (The original study, Rechard, 1995b, used 7 .9 x 10-2 because the repository area was larger [2.6 x 104 m2 versus 1.9x 104 m2] due to the greater number of containers needed for high-level waste stored as crdcine; see Section 3.2.) The probability of at least one inadvertent human intrttsion, P{N > O},uses a Poisson discrete analytic distribution function for exploratory drilling with a drilling rate (1.) of 3 boreholeskirea of waste (km2)/10,000 yr as recommended in Appen %: :~:~=';;~;:';; i.e., P{N > O} = 1 -e-, , calculation of the 10,000-yr probability of a criticality is calculated in Section 5.3 and is -2 x 10-3. The resulting probabilities of the summary scenarios (Fig. 6) show that scenarios S3, S6, and S7 can be neglected by virtue of EPA guidance in 40 CFR 191 that allows omission of categories of features, events, and processes that have probabilities of occurrence of less than 10A in 10,000 yr. For example, a criticality with volcanism (S3) has a very low probability of occurrence, -10-6 in the first 10,000 yr, assuming the events are independent.
Eliminating these scenarios leaves the base case scenario (S.), a scenario involving only repository criticality (S1), a scenario involving only volcanism (S2), a scenario involving only human intrusion (S4), end a scenario involving repository criticality and human intrusion (S5). Only the scenarios involving criticality are of interest here, and only the scenmio with just the criticality event (S1) is discussed further. A critical event on the surface, caused by drilling into a waste container, was not considered in this initial study because the deposition of the fissile material on the surface already represented a release, i.e., a criticality in a mud pit might be no more hazardous to chilling operators than that caused by just bringing radionuclides to the surface because the water would certainly shield the operators to an extent. A definitive analysis of the consequences would require information on the time of intrusion, detailed knowledge of the setup for the future drilling event, and models of Logic diagram to enumerate summary scenan"os, S) for jirst 10,000 yr of repository pe~ormance (a@er Rechard, 1995b, Figure 7-l he circulating fluid to examine the ability of the fluid to carry significant quantities of the very dense uranium fuel pellets, and was beyond the scope of this study. More important, the human intrusion event is a release mechanism for which the NAS no longer suggests that a probability be assigned (NAS, 1995) (see Section 2.1), and the scenario probability was near the threshold (1.1 x 10-4s 104). Also, the probability of an intrusion into the necessary number of containers with highly enriched uranium for a criticality at the surface is much lower than general intrusion into any container (i.e., pc" # pc because only 14% of the containers contain highly enriched uranium).
Categories of the Criticality Event
For bounding probabilities and consequences, the criticality event was divided into two basic conditions leading up to a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction in or near a container. The two basic conditions are (1) moderation (e.g., sufficient or insufficient water to efficiently moderate a nuclear chain reaction) and (2) assembly (i.e., slow, fast, and explosive assembly of the mass of fissile material, where slow refers to processes occurring over geologic time such as chemical precipitation, fast refers to processes on a short time scale such as gravity-driven collapse of spent fuel in a container, and explosive refers to processes occurring in microseconds)3 (Fig. 7) . The first condition categorizes the most important feature regulating the operation of an assembly in the natural environment (e.g., water moderator, see Section 5.1. 1). The second condition categorizes the time required (and thus power [energy/time] expanded) to assemble the critical mass. A similar categorization of criticality conditions is reported by Evans et al. (1994) and Rechard (1995b) but omits the explosive assembly.
Examples of the situations follow, together with a review of standard criticality calculations, natural analogues, and criticality experiments and accidents that are relevant to a criticality in a repository and can be used to satisfactorily bound the consequences of a critical condition. As discussed below, the consequences of all, except possibly explosive assembly, have similar consequences even though the probability that any of these situations could occur within a repository varies substantially. Rechard, 1995b , Fig. 10-3 ).
BOUNDING PROBABILITY OF CRITICAL EVENT
The assembly process (which includes the process of collecting fissile material in one general location and the final process of bringing together the fissile material into a critical mass) determines the probability. Although the details for this assembly process as modeled are discussed elsewhere (Rechard, 1995b) , in thk report we present information on analogous events and then general heuristic arguments regarding the probability of subevents (i.e., general categories of processes for which we have removed the dependence on time) of the criticality event to estimate a bounding probability. The moderated, slow rate of assembly type of criticality is represented by the natural reactors in uranium ore deposits in Gabon, Africa. The deposits are located within the Francevillian basin, located along Africa's west coast, which is divided into two regions (GauthierLafaye and Weber, 1989) : the northwest edge and central part. Eighty percent of Gabon's known uranium is found in the northwest edge, which holds three main ore deposits. The most economically important is the Oklo ore deposit, which contains 17,300 Mg or metric tonnes (19,070 short tons). Most of the ore is low grade, 0.2% to 1% uranium, with an average of -0.3%; a high grade ore of 20'%0 to 6070 is located at tectonic structures.
Probabilities of Criticality Conditions
The ore deposits occur within an unmetamorphosed sedimentary layer, the oldest high-grade sedimentary deposit known. The uranium-rich layer lies between a sandstone and conglomerate formation (designated FA) and a thick black shale and sandstone formation (designated FB). As proposed by Gauthier-Lafaye and Weber (1989), the FA formation was formed as a deltic deposit about 2.1 x 109years ago (2.1 Ga), during erosion of the Chaillu massif (Archean-age basement rock, 2.7 Ga); the FA formation is the likely source of the uranium. The FB formation was formed during settling of the basin, possibly 2.06 Ga, allowing seas to transgress across the basin and deposit 3000-to 5000-m-thick marine sediments, rich in organic material, thus burying the FA formation. Subsequent tectonic activity faulted and uplifted the basin. A second porosity was created when highly pressurized fluids hydrofractured the sandstone, allowing hydrocarbons and water to migrate; the hydrocmbons moving through the FB formation were trapped by the faults. Massive amounts of oxygen-rich waters in the wet equatorial climate circulating through the conglomerates in the FA formation dissolved and transported uranium. High concentrations of uraninite (U02) (20% to 60%) were precipitated as this uraniumrich water came in contact with the hydrocarbon fault traps because of the reducing environment from the organics, between the time that the FB formation was formed and the startup of the natural reactors.
About 16 Ienticular regions have been identified within the Oklo ore body that operated as natural reactors about 1.97 Ga, when natural uranium had a 235U content of -3.68'ZO ( Fig. 8) (Nagy, 1993; Smellie, 1995) . The first six natural reactor regions are typically 10 to 20 m in length and width, and less than 1 m thick. (Lamarsh, 1984) , operation of Oklo reactors (GauthierLaf~e et al., 1989) , rise in free 02 atmosphere (Holland, 1994) , plate movement (L.ocardi, 1988) , and age of Cigar Lake ore deposits (Cramer and Smellie, 1995) .
Pressurization of the water (30 to 40 MPa) from geologic conditions (Blanc, 1995) was such that the temperature ranged between 440 and 640 K (Gauthier-Lafaye 235U(uranium enrichment) et al., 1989). The content of and temperature are similar to a modern, engineered, pressurized water reactor (Fig. 8) . (It should be noted that pressurization of water is not possible in the unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain; hence, the power output would be significantly less ihan a pressurized system such as Oklo.)
Because the optimum water content of the reactor was quite low (12% to 15% by volume, 6% by weight) (Brookins, 1984; Cowan, 1976) , the reactors may have formed in an overmoderated condition, with sporadic drying as the cause of the criticality. Thereafter, each assembly may have operated in a cyclic manne~first, shutting down, since the keff of the assembly would decrease below one as the water (which served as a moderator for the assembly) expanded near its critical point (Cowan and Norris, 1978) or turned to steam, and then sustaining a nuclear chain reaction when the water cooled or sufficient liquid water percolated down through fractures in the rock. The convective circulation of water heated by the natural reactor continued to concentrate the ore to between 20% and 6070 uranium around the reactor (Nagy et al., 1991 , reports on fission products precipitated with uranium), altered the hydrocarbons to form bitumen that enclosed some natural reactors , and dissolved quartz in the sandstones. However, reactor analysis indicates that the continued enrichment of the uranium ore was not as important to sustained reactor operation as the ability to increase the amount of moderating water and transmute any neutron poisons ("burnable poisons") to compensate for creation of fission products that absorbed neutrons (Reuss, 1975; Naudet, 1975; Maeck et al., 1975; Cowan, 1976) . The reactor behavior continued for about 2 x 105 to 8 x 105yr (Cowan et al., 1975; Gauthier-Lafaye et al., 1989) until conditions changed significantly, e.g., when the reactor cavity collapsed because of hydrothermal dissolution of silica in the sandstone and conglomerate, with a subsequent lack of an optimum configuration in the collapsed cavity (Smellie, 1995) . For the first six reactors, researchers have estimated that 6 Mg (6.6 short tons) of 235Uwas consumed out of -800 Mg (880 short tons) of high grade uranium (Gauthier-Lafaye et al., 1989; Cowan and Norns, 1978) . Consumption of 6 Mg corresponds to -1028 fissions or -15,000 MW-yr (see App. B; Walker et al., 1989) . Although up to 3 Mg (3.3 short tons) of 239Pu was also produced in the natural reactor (Cowan and Norris, 1978) from neutron absorption by 23*U,very little fissioned (2% to 6%) (Maeck et 235U; a large portion of this al., 1975) . Most decayed to 235Uinventory was then subsequently fissioned.
If a criticality in the highly enriched fuel can occur in or near a repository, we believe the Oklo type of criticality behavior is the most likely, provided enough water becomes available to change conditions within the repository and to slowly dissolve and remove either the boron or the uranium and moderate the reaction. Consequently, the probability of this type of criticality was used for this report (Section 5.2). Although thought to be a possibly common occurrence soon after its discovery, the OkIo phenomenon remains unusual because other uranium deposit sites of the Proterozoic System of the Precambrian Era show no evidence of forming natural reactors. Any other ore deposits that may have formed natural reactors during this period must have undergone erosion and redistribution (Cowan, 1976) or been mined without detection.
To elaborate, the richest uranium ore deposit in the world at Cigar Lake in Canada has been present for -1.3 Ga (Cramer and Smellie, 1994; Cramer and Sargent, 1994) , but shows no sign of a criticality. This deposit, with an enrichment of -2% when formed, has an enrichment somewhat greater than the plausible enrichment boundary of 1.6?Z0proposed by Naudet (1977) , which corresponds to the lowest enrichment used in portions of commercial reactors (Lamarsh, 1983) . The minimum possible boundary for natural reactors is 1Yo enrichment (400 Ma) (Naudet, 1978) . Consequently, the Nepal I ore deposit in northern Mexico (Pearcy et al., 1995) , which formed 7.9 Ma as the result of hydrothermal solutions precipitating uraninite in highly fractured regions below the water table of a -43.8 Ma volcanic tuff formation, is too young to have had natural reactors.
High Moderation, Fast Rate of Assembly (Critical Events in Aqueous Solutions)
A moderated, fast rate of assembly corresponds to the critical aqueous-ty~accidents in nuclear fuel pro-23 u ad 239PU aqueous solutions) cessing plants (i.e., (Table II) or moderated metal and metal-oxide system accidents and experiments (Table III) . The reported events generated <1020 fissions (-350 kW-hr, -1250 MJ, or an equivalent consumption of -16 mg of 235U), 18 fissions (-5 kW-hr, $M~~~br~upo~f a!~.~~~g 2351J). Also note that the maximum number of immediate fissions is also only about 1018 or a maximum quick release of energy of 18.7 MJ. This type of criticality excursion could be the result of a human intrusion situation that generates a slurry consisting of fissile material and water (moderator)-a scenario not evaluated because the intrusion already represented a release, as noted earlier, and precise details of the drilling operation were needed to evaluate consequences. (A situation in which water dripped onto a mass of fissile material [previously assembled through, for example, collapse of a partially corroded container] that was not critical until the addition of water would. resemble an Oklo situation, discussed above.) No characteristic of these situations makes it more probable than a high moderated, slow rate of assembly (discussed above) or an unmoderated, fast rate of assembly (discussed below) because an additional condition, such as an earthquake or human intrusion, is required.
High Moderation, Explosive Assembly
A highly moderated, explosive assembly can be represented by one of the events that was recently hypothesized by Bowman and Venneri (1[996) .4 Bowman and Vennen (1996) describe the effects of six situations, which occur as the result of an arbitrary assembly of some fissile mass of 239Pu, water content, and pure silica content (Si02) (instead of tuff). The six situations differ primarily in whether the assumed collected mass would experience negative or positive feedback during a critical event. Bowman and Venneri further suppose that all situations with positive feedback could result in nuclear explosions.
Briefly, the situations can be summarized as follows. Situation 1 involves movement of water into an already deposited sphere of fissile material, which then goes critical with negative feedback. A modification to Situation 1 was also included, in which the sphere of fissile material contains more mass than is required to go critical. After being deposited into a small region, the mass goes critical and then fissile material is dispersed out into a dry matrix through "water-steam explosions," creating a new configuration that can experience positive feedback. Situation 2 involves the transport of 10 kg of fissile material from the container and uniform distribution of the material into a 0.5-m-radius region of silica with a 0.1 water mole fraction (an uncommon method of describing water saturation) that goes critical with negative feedback. In Situation 3, a 70-kg mass of fissile material is transported and deposited in a 2-mradius region with 0.15 mole fraction of water, resulting in a configuration that can experience positive feedback. Situation 4 is similar to Situation 3 except that 15 kg of fissile material is deposited in a l-m-radius region with 0.27 mole fraction of water. Situation 5 involves collecting 70 kg of fissile material in a 2-m radius; the fissile material is assumed to remain noncritical because of too much moderator (i.e., overmoderated with water). When water is removed through drying, the fissile mass goes critical and experiences positive feedback. Finally, Situation 6 involves a 2-kg mass of fissile material deposited into a 0.3-m-radius region with a water mole fraction of 0.60, which experiences positive feedback. Note that a water mole fraction of 0.60 is beyond the 0.16 to 0.26 water mole fractions that are considered physically possible in the lithophysal and nonlithophysal tuff near the repository honzon.5
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In orderto obtainthe nuclearexplosionproposedby BowmanandVenneri(1996) ,the assemblymustoccurin rnicrosecond~thus the assembly is termed"explosive."The needfor suchrapidassemblyis explainedin Section5.1.6,LowModeration, ExplosiveAssembly.Also,note that in this report,assemblymeansassemblinginto a configurationthat is supercriticrd.Thk assemblycan occureitherfromfissilematerial "comingtogether"or frommateriatdiffusinguniformty"out"intothe moderator. 5
As noted in Section3.6, the maximumintactmatrixporosityof the nonlithophysal tuff at a proposedrepositoryhorizonis 0.12 (O. 16water mole fraction),and the maximumintactmatrixporosityin a lithophysaltuff zonebetween20 and 130m belowthe repositoryis 0.26 (0.33 water mole fraction). Theseconversionsassumethat the poresare fully filledwith waterand that the pure silicamatrixis cristobolite. The intact porosityreachesa maximumof 0.50 (0.58watermole fraction)only near the water'tablqhowever,the traveltime of the moderately adsorbeduraniumcan average50,000years. (Also,plutoniumis welladsorbedandtakesmuchlonger.)Furthermore,extensivemixingwith the low enrichedspentfuel and high-levelwastewitl likelyhaveoccurredat this dktance and time. 
Failure to drain tank
Critics of the analyses put forward by Bowman and Venneri focus their attention either on the consequences (usually critics with weapons experience) or the assembly process (usually those with geologic background). With regard to consequences, critics wonder (1) whether regions of positive feedback actually exist in a volcanic tuff system versus a pure silica system, (2) whether a positive feedback mechanism that exists briefly in a fissile mass implies a nuclear explosion, and (3) how much energy is potentially released from a positive feedback mechanism. In answering the first concern, volcanic tuff is far from being pure silica, containing several elements that can significantly absorb neutrons. Also, the assembly is not a homogeneous mixture, but is instead heterogeneous so that material can actually shield the fissile mass from neutrons ("self-shielding"). Given this information, there are few situations where positive feedback could occuc also much more fissile mass than that purported by Bowman and Venneri (1996) is required to go critical (Parsons et al., 1995) .
In replying to the second concern, credible means for changing the system naturally-e.g., removing the moderator from an overmoderated system by evaporation or water vaporization-are slow in relation to the microseconds required for nuclear explosions (see Section 5.1.6; Stratton, 1983; Sanchez et al., 1995) . For example, even the maximum transfer rates achievable through pumping in nuclear fabrication facilities for PU02 and PU02-U02 are incapable of causing and sustaining a nuclear explosion (Hansen et al., 1976) .
With regard to the third concern, the energy release calculations are suspect because the initial conditions for the calculations are neither justified nor are they the same as the initial conditions used to describe the situations (i.e., a kern= 1.1 is used in the energy release calculations, but no explanation is given of how a naturrd system moves from just critical' at kefl= 1 to keff = 1.1, an excess reactivity of -14). For example, the porosity of the tuff matrix is too great to confine the critical assembly, thus virtually all of the energy generated would be heat rather than kinetic energy (Kimpland, 1996; Parsons et al., 1995) . Finally, there is no natural analogue, accident, or experiment that can be cited as an example of a system, which starts at near critical (kefl= 1), and then has a nuclear explosion initiated solely as the result of positive feedback.
Critics of the assembly process (Canavan et al., 1995; Van Konynenburg, 1996) are concerned with its improbability because of geologic concerns. Because the six situations are only generally described (e.g., terms like "water-steam explosion" and "driven by fission heat through rock" are used), they must be translated into known geologic phenomena and a complete conceptual model developed so that the corresponding hypothesis can be tested for reasonableness. For example, we note that in order to collect such a large mass of fissile material, all six situations require groundwater to promote corrosion, dissolution, transport, and deposition, although these conditions are not specifically stated.
Furthermore, we note that as the hypothesized fissile material is collected (probably through precipitation, though Bowman and Venneri use the phrase "water carrying plutonium oxide particles and depositing them somewhere else," possibly implying colloid transport), the groundwater would be present to act as a moderator, resulting in either a high moderation, slow rate of assembly (e.g., Oklo natural reactors) or high moderation, high rate of assembly (aqueous accidents). To illustrate, Bowman and Venneri's Situation 3 assumes 70 kg of 239Pu 2-m radius, 0.15 water mole fraction, and positive fe~dback; however, earlier, Bowman and Venneri showed that only negative feedback occurs with 239Puin a 0.3-m-radius region and a water about 2 kg of mole fraction of 0.15. Thus, to obtain initial conditions with positive feedback, the Bowman-Venneri explosion hypothesis (which has not been observed) requires the system to pass through a possible Oklo-like situation (which has been observed) requiring less fissile mass.
A similar problem, in which the system must pass from an Oklo-like situation to another situation, is more explicit in the variation of Situation 1 hypothesized by Bowman, in which the system is silica-moderated rather than water-moderated. They hypothesize the system could experience positive feedback either as the silica expanded because of its positive coefficient of thermal expansion or as the fissile mass expanded in diameter (Taubes, 1995) . (The increase in multiplication factor [kem] as the fissile mass expands was first studied by Carter [1973] .) Although Si02 has the classical characteristics of a moderator, it is very inefficient. Assembly of fissile mass with silica as the moderator for the chain reaction would require, first, water to create the optimal mixture of the fissile material with the silica (simple diffusion of the fissile material into the tuff would not occur within a reasonable time scale). Consequently, prior to removing the water, the conditions would favor startup of the nuclear chain reaction with water as the moderator instead. Thus anew mechanism must then be invoked ("water-steam explosions"), but it is not a credible mechanism to reach the hypothesized dry conditions (Van Konynenburg, 1996) . In essence, the condkions necesssry to produce the explosion hypothesis are inconsistent with the conditions necessary to produce the initial conditions for the assembly. This inconsistency in assumptions is a very serious error in developing a scientifically acceptable conceptual model of a phenomenon (Rechard, 1995a) .
Based on these criticisms, we argue that the Bowman and Venneri situations resemble highly moderated, slow or fast rates of assembly discussed in the previous two sections, even though in rare instances the system could experience positive feedback for a time; we assigned a probability of zero to the highly moderated, explosive assembly category. Although not used in the above arguments, the mechanisms also may be improbable. General geochernical processes for separating the fissile mass from poisons and reconcentrating it are difficult to achieve. Examination of these geochemical processes has been presented when the dissolution of the spent nuclear fuel was simulated along with its consequences (Rechard, 1995b) .
Low Moderation, Slow Rate of Assembly
A low or unmoderated, slow rate of assembly would roughly correspond to conditions in a breeder reactor. In a natural setting, a credible method for slowly assembling the fissile material without water or human intervention is unknown and probably thermodynamically impossible because it would require unreasonably large decreases in local entropy. Consequently, the probability was set to zero. However, a fast rate of assembly from a sudden collapse of the fuel after sufficient corrosion of the support matrix is considered in the next section.
Low Moderation, Fast Rate of Assembly (Experiments with Fissionable Materials)
Low moderation corresponds to assemblies that contain little or no water or ahy other moderating materials, i.e., elements such as hydrogen, carbon, and beryllium, which have a high probability of scattering neutrons while simultaneously not absorbing many neutrons. This situation would create a "hard" critical nuclear assembly; the "hard" descriptor means that the neutrons in this nuclear assembly have a "hard" (high energy) spectrum. As mentioned earlier, this situation might develop from partial corrosion of the support structure followed by a sudden collapse, e.g., an earthquake (rE S 10-3~-l). An unmoderated, fast rate of assembly would likely correspond to accidents and experiments carried out at Los Alamos National Laboratory (e.g., Godiva Reactor [Paxton, 1983] ). Some of the accidents yielded between 1016 and 1017 fissions. The number of fissions produced by prompt neutrons was calculated to be 6 x 1017, which is comparable to the number of prompt fissions estimated to have been produced in aqueous accidents (Table II) . "Bethe-Tait" bounding type calculations done for evaluating the safety of two fast reactors yield upper bounds of 3 x 1019fissions for assemblies with a large mass of fissionable material (Meyer et al., 1967; Bethe and Tait, 1956) . A hypothetical criticality accident in a waste supercompactor also represents an unmoderated, fast rate of assembly. Calculations showed hypothetical total yields between 1018 and 1019 fissions and bulk temperatures between 412 and 912 K (Plaster et al., 1995) .
Low Moderation, Explosive Assembly
Low moderation, with explosive assembly, is similar to a nuclear weapon but requires special design features-a situation that cannot occur by acciden~it is mentioned here for completeness.
To elaborate, although a kc,> 1 is a necessary condition for an atomic explosion, it alone is not sufficient (see Appendix A). Special conditions must exist such that the rate of increase in kefl is very rapid. To obtain a rapid increase in ketirequires, in turn, that sufficient energy be added to the system such that the fissile mass be assembled very rapidly to allow for many generations of neutrons (each uranium fission and thus each generation requiring about 10 nanoseconds) to produce massive numbers of fissions and thereby sufficient heat and kinetic energy before negative feedback changes the configuration and limits the number of neutron generations. For 239Puand 235U, an atomic explosion is typically produced by imploding a sphere of fissile mass together through detonating surrounding explosives at precisely the same time and injecting a large number of neutrons (not just stray neutrons) at precisely the correct moment (i.e., basic concept of Fat Man). For just 235U, a somewhat simpler design (i.e., basic concept of Little Boy) is possible in which a large number of neutrons is injected precisely at the same time that two subcritical amounts of 235U are explosively brought together to form a supercritical mass (an explosive assembly with a velocity between 300 and 1000 n-ds [1000 and 3000 ft/s].6 This velocity is -300 to 1000 times faster than the "fast" assembly caused by the acceleration of gravity over -1 m. More details on the design of nuclear weapons can be found elsewhere (Serber, 1992; Hansen, 1988; Bickel, 1979) .
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This design is not possible with~g~b e~~"sesmayneutrons from 240pupreventit
Fault Tree for High Moderation, Slow Rate of Assembly
Since their development by Bell Labs &d subsequent use by Boeing on the Minuteman Missile in 1963 (Haasl, 1965; Hixenbaugh, 1968) , fault trees have been used to evaluate the probability of failures within complex human-engineered systems.
Consequently, a method for developing an understanding about the likelihood of the assembly of fissile material is to develop a fault tree in which several distinct events leading up to a critical condition are postulated, and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence for each event are then combined to arrive at overall probabilities. Although it is possible to use fault trees to evaluate changes in states of components within a geologic disposal system, their use requires care. An advantage of fault trees in this type of analysis is that their structured approach can quickly identify probabilities of a criticality in a repository, and it was this advantage that prompted their use for developing hypotheses of behavior in this study (Fig. 9) . Because of the proposed design for the multi-purpose canister assumed in this study, a crucial step to developing a critical condition is corrosion of the container and subsequent separation of the boron (in the berated stainless steel support structure) and the highly enriched uranium in the spent fuel. Once the separation occurs, various types of criticalities, as previously described, may be feasible. Consequently, the important group of events in the fault tree involves the separation of boron from the highly enriched uranium and is described below. One method for evaluating this probability, which is used here, is to determine the rate of formation of conditions conducive to a critical event. The conditions for container failure, removal of boron and general assembly are described below for the most probable branch (Fig. 9) .
5.2.1
Container Failure
The only credible manner of destroying the container and removing the boron from around the spent fuel is through corrosion and transport by water. The importance of water is similar to that for general release from the disposal of radionuclides in the repository without a critical event. The following discussion assumes that the failure mode of concern is from corrosion as the result of Iiactures that drip water. Certainly failure from corrosion due to humid air, or corrosion from the partially saturated tuff matrix contacting the container, can occur. However, these two modes of container corrosion would not likely provide enough water Fault tree to evaluate probability of a criticality event, showing that the branch with high moderation and slow rate of assembly is most probable. As evident from the text, the great dificul~is assigning probabilities to the initiating conditions. to transport and separate the boron and uranium, and thus allow a critical event hence, they are not discussed further.7
Analysts currently assume that the repository at Yucca Mountain would be dry initially or, if not completely dry, that containers would not be placed near any seepage found. Hence, for corrosion to occur from fractures that drip water, new seepage areas would have to appear.
Possible sources for this water include increased precipitation at the site, as the result of changes in climate; the water could then percolate down and intersect the repository. Although the probability of this change in initiating events is unknown, here we assume substantial change cannot occur within 10,000 yr (consistent with EPAs intent in limiting analysis to this time period [40 CFR 191] ). However, a very similar effect can occur with the hot repository concept modeled here (see Section 3.5), in that vaporization and subsequent condensation can cause redistribution of the water in the matrix pores (-6570 saturated) such that parts of the repository have dripping fractures. Simulations can model this effect (Rechard, 1995b) , but in this report we use climatic change as an analogue for this effect and, in turn, use the information from Rainier Mesa, a nearby region of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) with precipitation twice as great as at Yucca Mountain (Wang et al., 1993; Russell et al., 1978) . Although the spacing of the potentially wet fractures is not known, here we used -25 m, which is a frequent spacing of wet fractures in the E and O tunnels, which are located under Rainier Mesa (Camahan et al., 1991) , even though the number of connected fractures has been increased by nuclear testing (Clebsch, 1960; Russell et al., 1978) . In these tunnels, the spacing of moist fractures can extend up to 300 m; in G tunnel at the NTS, only 1 or 2 wet fractures exist. Consequently, a 25-m spacing represents a reasonably tight spacing for the volcanic tuff at Yucca Mountain in a wetter climate. With a fracture spacing of 25 m and a container length of 5 m, approximately 20% of the containers would eventually fail from wet fractures.
The time to container breach is about 300 yr, based on a fully immersed generalized corrosion rate of 0.4 rnm/yr at 100"C for czibon steel (Kirby, 1979; Soo, 1984) and a fully immersed local penetration rate of 2 mm/yr at 100"C for Incoloy 825 (Fig. 2) (Wilson et al., 1994, Table 13-5) . (The maximum rate for Incoloy 825 is high, because above 80"C Incoloy 825 is sensitive to localized corrosion from pitting.) Faulty containers could shorten this life (Rechard, 1995b) , but for bounding calculations the container life is already very short and cannot significantly influence the probability of a critical event.
5.2.2
Physical Removal of Boron
Once the container has been penetrated, the uranium andlor boron can be transported. Boron in molten berated stainless steel is not very soluble and forms precipitate bondes, frequently chromium boride, within the stainless steel. In general, metal borides are very hard, refractory, and chemically inert because of the strong covalent metal-boron bond (Cotton and Wilkinson, 1972) . Because of this bond, the bulk stainless steel will likely corrode faster than the borides, which will remain as small unreacted particles within the corrosion products. Consequently, whether the boron, which is highly soluble once released from the chromium boride particles, is released faster from the bonde particles than the low soluble uranium depends on the amounts of water and oxygen present these questions were examined in a simulation (Rechard, 1995b) . In the heuristic arguments presented in this section, however, the quantities of water and oxygen are not evaluated and so either boron or uranium transport has to be assumed.
Because transport of uranium requires a reconcentration of the uranium (because the solution is not critical), which is inherently less probable (ore bodies are not ubiquitous in the earth's crust), boron removal is assumed in this section. In the container design considered here, the amount of boron that must be removed before a critical event could occur is quite large. In the designs -0.02~o boron in the stainless steel of the support structure was sufficient to prevent sustained nuclear chain reactions; yet, commercially available berated stainless steel is 290 boron-100 times that required.g Here, the boron release is assumed to be congruent with the generalized corrosion of the stainless steel, which is highly conservative because the generalized corrosion of stainless steel would still leave the chromium bonde particles, from which the boron would still ha~e to escape as noted above. For stainless steel, McCright et al. (1987) report a fully immersed, generalized corrosion rate at 100"C of about 0.1 microns/y, this is likely near the high end of possible corrosion rates (Fig. 2) . 
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For the simulation (Rechard, 1995b) ,this inabilityto transportwas not assumeda priori because any type of corrosion prior to having enough water to fill fractures could reduce the time to failure; other conservative conditions in the analysis, such as fully wet corrosion rates, are assumed to compensate for thk simplifying but non-conservativeassumption. "Bum up of boron" (boron depletion by capturing a neutron and then conversionto Mhhrrn)is not an issue because the container is not in an intense neutron flux as occurs in a reactor. Rather, the boron is present to prevent any stray neutrons from starting a chain reaction.
,
About 7000 yr would be required to corrode all of the stainless steel at this maximum rate. (At the mean of the distribution used in this study, it would take 105 yr, and at the median of the distribution, it would take 7 x 106 yr.)
5.2.3
Probability of Conditions Conducive to a Critical Event
The only known basis for determining a rate of formation of critical events that accounts for phenomena not specifically mentioned above (i.e., fracture spacing and climatic change) is the number of uranium sites in the world that have gone critical. Only about 16 reactor zones in the Oklo ore deposit in the Francevillian basin are known to have gone critical. At the Oklo, the rate of formation of the reactors is unknown, but the upper bound is the time required to form the uranium-rich layer, about 108 years (2.06 Ga -1.97 Ga). The lower bound is possibly the minimum operating life of the reactors, about 2 x 105 years (see Section 5.1.1). Furthermore, six of the reactor zones involved about 800 MTHM.
Thus, the maximum formation rate is -3.75 x 10-8 events/yr/MTHM (6 events/[800 MTHM q 2 x 105 yr]).
Clearly, given the heuristic arguments described above that do not depend upon simulation of the container, and given enough time, conditions conducive to a sustained nuclear chain reaction could occur. This probability, however, is conditional on the container being under a dripping fracture and more infiltration occurring through the mountain than is thought now to occur. As noted above, the probability of greater infiltration from fluid redistribution was conservatively set to one, and the probabili~of being under a dripping fracture was set to 0.2. Finally, the amount of fissile material that can go critical is only highly enriched uranium (210 MTHM). The remainder of the DOE waste is either high-level waste that does not contain fissile material or is similar to commercial spent nuclear fuel whose enrichment is below 2'ZO. Fig. 8 graphically shows that for about 2 x 109 years, no known uranium ore deposits with enrichments less than 2% have gone critical in a natural setting. Commercial spent nuclear fuel will also have enrichments less than 2% and, furthermore, contain numerous fission fragments that readily absorb chain-carrying neutrons. Therefore, the rate of formation, r(t), is 1.6 x 10-6 yr-l (0.2 q 210 MTHM q 3.75 x 10-8events/yr/MTHM).
In the above argument, the rate of 1.6 x 10-6events/ yr is sensitive to the assumed time required to form a natural reactor. (Recall that 2 x 105 yr was used, based on the time of operation of an Oldo reactor.) Alternately, one can use the uranium volubility in tuff and possible flow rates of water through the repository to determine a rate. However, evaluating a flow rate in a fracture system is difficult because both the infiltration and the surface area contributing to the fracture flow are highly uncertain. Hence, the following text solves for the flow rate (q) based on the 1.6 x 10-6 events/yr to check for reasonableness.
The volubility of uranium (S) in an oxic environment is typically measured at 10-5 rnM (Cramer and Smellie, 1994) , but analysis of the volcanic tuff repository frequently uses theoretically calculated values for an oxic environment with a mean value of 10-1"5mM . Based on this latter volubility, the flow rate (q) is 29 m3/yr or 2.9 x 105 m3 over 10,000 yr [1.6 x 10-6 events/yr = (6 events/800 Mg)(10-3 rnM)(q)]. Using an infiltration rate of 24 mm/ yr that occurs at Rainier Mesa (Wang et al., 1993) (equivalent to complete desaturation -87 m above the hypothetical repository) yields a contributing area of 1200 m2. This contributing area contradicts the 25-m spacing of wet fractures assumed initially and so, to be consistent, the area must be reduced by a factor of two to 625 m2. Hence, the time to form a natural reactor in a Yucca Mountain-like environment is underestimated by at least two times and probably by two or more orders of magnitude (the latter because the theoretically calculated volubility of uranium is likely high [Cramer and Smellie, 1994] ).
Next, we determine the probability in the first 10,000 yr to be consistent with the probabilities cited for the volcanism and human intrusion in the logic tree for developing scenarios described in Section 4.2. The probability model is based on the failure-rate function (Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980, p. 51 ) defined by r(t) = -tidt ln [l-F(t) ], where t is time elapsed since the disposal system was closed and F(t) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the first time, Z when failure occurs (i.e., F(t) = P(T < t)). This expression can be integrated to givẽ
Here r(t) is a constant and equal to 8 x 10-7 (1/2 of 1.6 x 10-6) over a period of 10,000 yr. In the first 10,000 yr, however, the containers must first fail and the boron be separated from the uranium, which requires at least 7300 yr to occur, as described above (300 yr for container breach and 7000 yr for boron removal). Integrating equation 1 from 7300 to 10,000 yields a probability of 2 x 10-3, which was used in evaluating probabilities of scenarios in the above section (Section 4.0 and Fig. 6 ) (10-2 was used in the original study). The probability evaluated by this fault tree applies primarily to the "no intrusion, no volcanism" branch in the event txee (Fig. 6) . A fault tree, applicable to each major condition of the event tree in Fig. 6 is needed (e.g., human intrusion, but no volcanism); however, each fault tree provides only an order of magnitude number that does not change substantially and so they will not be shown here. The above arguments noted the possibility of at least a two order of magnitude drop in the rate, which would reduce the probability to less than 10-4 over 10,000 yr. Such-a low value eliminates the critical event from further consideration, according to the guidance of 40 CFR 191. However, 40 CFR 191 no longer applies, and the time frame of interest will likely increase to 106 yr (see Section 2.1). Although the authors believe that the probability is likely low even over 106 yr, based on experience in analyzing geologic disposal systems, very low values over 106 yr cannot be easily demonstrated for scenarios containing a critical event, without a more fundamental simulation of the phenomena potentially creating a critical condition. For example, Rechard (1995b) shows the extreme difficulty in separating fissile material, with natural phenomena, from any neutron absorbers (e.g., fission fragments and/or boron) and to collect fissile material to initiate any type of critical condition.
BOUNDING CONSEQUENCES OF CRITICAL EVENT FOR SLOW AND FAST RATES OF ASSEMBLY
In the above presentation, explosive assembly was argued to have a probability of zero. However, slow and fast rates of assembly had probabilities greater than 10-4 over 10,000 yr. Consequently, bounding calculations of the consequences of a critical condition were performed (assuming the boron and uranium had separated) so that, if the consequences were negligible, a basis would be established for neglecting the'scenario. (Note that when this approach is used, it is important to hypothesize reasonable initial conditions.) Consequences of a critical event can include (1) creating a greater radiological hazard by producing more radioisotopes from the fission process, including more fission gases, and (2) damaging the tuff repository by compromising the isolating and stabilizing functions of the geologic medium by generating kinetic or additional heat energy. These consequences are discussed in the following four sections.
Bounds on Total Energy (Fissions)
Both moderated and unmoderated fast rates of assembly release similar amounts of energy (as represented by fissions) of between 10*5 and 1020 fissions. These rates provide an empirical bound on the energy release from a critical event because in an unsaturated repository, the criticality is assumed to occur at near atmospheric pressure with a breached container. For comparison, a 70,000-MTHM Yucca Mountain-type repository of spent fuel with burn-up of 40,000 MWd/ MTHM would represent on the order of 1031 fissions, and the 12,060-MTHM repository used in this study would represent on the order of 1030 fissions. (Fuel in commercial nuclear reactors typically has a bumup range of 25,000 to 40,000 MWd/MTHM, with an average of 30,000 MWdMI'HM [Foster and Wright, 1977; Appendix A, 40 CFR 191] .) Clearly, an increase in fissions from one critical event of 1020 would be negligible; only radioisotopes with very short half-lives would show any appreciable increase in comparison to the original inventory (see Section 6.2).
Because the fast rate of assembly, such as a gravitydriven collapse of spent fuel in a container, would occur sporadically, if at all, the slow rates of assembly such as those found in the Oklo phenomena, which can be considered continuous, could produce more total fissions. Both the magnitude and the rate of the Oklo phenomena are unknown. For this study, we assume a maximum number of fissions per event equal to the unmoderated, fast assembly (1020) and a rate of one event per day (this rate is defended in Section 6.3). One critical event occurring every day for 10,000 yr would amount to -1026 fissions, and one critical event occurring every day for one million years would amount to -1028 fissions, which is only 170 and 0.1 ?ZO of the fission inventory represented by the 12,060-and 70,000-MTHM repositories, respectively.
Another bounding approach that yields similar amounts of energy is to assume that the 210-Mg fissile contents of all 372 containers of highly enriched fuel undergo a burnup of 40,000 MWd/MTHM (which corresponds to a fission of -4.3'%0of the 235U atoms in commercial PWR fuel); this situation would result in -Ids fissions. Alternately, using the fact that six events at Oklo occurred in 800 MTMH, consuming 6 MTHM (i.e., 1 MTHM consumed/event), then for 210 MTHM of highly enriched fiel, 102* fissions occur. The 1028 fissions are identical to the total power estimated for the Oklo reactors (Section 5.1. 1).
Increased Radioisotope Inventory
The radioisotope inventory is an important component when evaluating the performance of a geologic disposal system. A sustained nuclear chain reaction would increase the radioisotope inventory, but only by a very small amount, as follows. While the initial evaluation (see Evans et al., 1994) was made using , 0RIGEN2.1 (Croff, 1983; ORNL, 1995) , a relatively simple expression is presented here from which to calculate increases, assuming constant power generation from criticality.
The additional inventory caused by a constant fission rate and accounting for depletion from radioactive decay is the solution of the equation, flldt = Cf -w, where N is the number of atoms of one product from a fission, A is the decay constant and equal to in 2/t1f2, where tln is the half-life of radioisotope product, and Cf is the growth rate (Ci/s) and equal to the fission rate (rf) (expressed as Ci/s) times the standard fission product yield (@. Solving this equation and adding in the initial inventory of the fission product yields
A possible gaseous radioisotope of concern is 85Kr, but as is easily calculated based on a tl of 10.73 yr, a standard fission product yield (fY)from 85uof 001317 (Walker et al., 1989) , a fission rater of 1020fissions/day or -1015 fissions/s, which converts to 5.5 X 10-6 Ci of 85Kr/s and an initial inventory (NO)of 5.379 x 102 Ci, the in~entory is largest when initially placed in the repository (Evans et al., 1994; Rechard, 1995b) .
Neptunium-237 is a long-lived isotope (t1J2 = 2.14 x 106yr) that is of potential concern in a tuff repository (Rechard, 1995b) , because it is mobile in very oxic 237Npis created by neutron absorpsolutions. However tion rather than as a fission product (i.e., created rima-! lily by 235U absorbing neutrons that first form 23 U and then 237U,followed by beta decay to 237Np). Assuming neutron flux conditions in the natural reactor are bound by the ATR spent nuclear fuel (which represents the highly enriched spent fuel category), then the increase in 237Np can be bounded. For the ATR fuel of 72 MTHM, the 235U was reduced from 93% to 82% (-7.9 Mg of 2351Jwas fissioned) and produced 17 Ci 237Np out of a total 237Np activity of 1264 Ci (Rechard, 1995b) . The l&8 fissions assumed for a critical event in a repository 235U. Hence, taking the ratio, the represents -3.9 Mg 237Npincrease would be -8 Ci or only 0.6Y0.
Increased Heat
When modeling the unmoderated, fast assembly conditions, the theoretical local temperature from a burst of thermal energy rose to between 400 and 900 K (Plaster et al., 1995) . However, the thermal energy released from a moderated, slow assembly situation in unsaturated tuff would be much less because the fissile material would be at atmospheric pressure. Thus the maximum temperature before the criticality event stopped would be below 373 K in order to maintain the presence of the water moderator. This maximum temperature helps determine the rate (power) of approximately one criticality event per day as follows.
As mentioned previously, the criticality event may occur either at the container after removal of the boron, or outside the container in the volcanic tuff after transport and precipitation of the uranium. For the criticality event at the container, we assume the input must equal the radiative energy transfer from the surface of the cylindrical container through the air gap to the surface of the tunnel, which yields a steady-state power, q, of (Incropera and DeWitt, 1981, p. 655) In reality, the container would be corroded and the fissile mass would be on the tunnel floor, but the approximation is consistent with the rough estimations. The thermal energy of 13 kW is -1020 fissions/day (see App. B) and was used in Section 6.1 for the moderated, slow assembly when evaluating total fissions possible over 106yr. This value of 1020fissions is also consistent with the rate assumed for the Oklo natural reactors for evaluating the probability (i.e., 6 Mg/2 x 105 yr = 2 x 1020 fissions/day). Assuming 1.6 critical events ([6 events/ 800 MTHM] q 210 MTHM), to be consistent with Section 5.2.3, then the power from criticality in the repository is -21 kW. For the hypothetical 12,060-MTHM repository, the thermal energy in the year 2030 would be 4000 kW. Hence, the 13-kW to 21-kW thermal power produced is at most 0.5% of the thermal power normally produced from radioactive decay 30 yr from the time at which the waste was placed in the geologic repository and not sufficient, by itself, to significantly alter the unsaturated fluid flow near the repository. Therefore, the heat energy produced is well within that &ticipated in the repository.
Furthermore, the heat energy is not sufficient to create exotic conditions such as vaporizing fissile material to reach the initial condition claimed by Bowman and Venneri (1996) .
The indefinite geometry for the situation of criticality in the volcanic tuff after transport and precipitation of the uranium makes the calculation of a steady-state power more difficult. Here we assume a point power source in water-saturated tuff. For steady-state, the power is determined by the radial distance from the source, where ambient temperatures are assumed. If a 40-m radius is assumed (100 times the radius of a 0.4-m "point source" of an approximately 6-kg uranium isotope mixture from the Am fi,tel-see Fig. 1 ), then the power over 106 yr is -20 kW, similar to that used above for a criticality in the repository tunnel (Carslaw and Jaeger, 1959; Rechard, 1995b, p. 13 This estimate of 20 kW for a 0.4-m-radius sphere is 1000 times greater than the estimated power density of 0.1 kW/m3 at Oklo (Cowan and Norris, 1978) and thus likely very conservative.
Potential Physical Damage to Tuff
Noticeable physical damage to the tuff would require a rapid energy release per unit time (i.e., high power). The moderated, slow assembly is inherently limited in power in an unsaturated environment at atmospheric pressure because lack of water stops the nuclear reaction. Indeed, it was this inherent power limit caused by boiling water that was used to establish a maximum 20 tissionslday. A criticality from a power of about 10 sudden, gravity-assisted collapse of a partially corroded container could possibly release energy over a short time period similar to the aqueous and unmoderated, fissile metal accidents. The maximum energy release from prompt neutrons for the aqueous accident and calculated by Bethe-Tait analysis was 6 x 1017 fissions or 18.7 MJ (Section 5.1.5). This small amount of rapidly produced energy release per event (-4.5 kg TNT [-10 Ibs] [Walker et al., 1989] ) would be unlikely to cause any significant damage to the immediate rock 300 m (-1000 ft) under the surface.
This result can be shown by using an empirical equation developed for designing buildings that may experience explosive mishaps (Baker et al., 1980) . The true radius of a potential spherical void (or camouflet) formed beneath the surface (the void minus the debris) from this explosion is RT = 1.053 (W)0252 d0135, [5] where RT is true radius (ft), d is depth below, surface (ft), and W is weight of explosive (lbs). The weight, rather than the energy from the explosive, is used in the empirical equation because the exponent is so small (-1/4); the type of rock is not used for rough estimates because it has a secondary effect. The potential void radius is 1.4 m (4.8 ft)-more than the 0.9-m radius of the uncollapsed container but less than the 2.15-m radius of the original tunnel.
This estimated radius is larger than the radius obtained by scaling down from underground nuclear tests.l" Specifically, assuming that darnage occurs below a specific failure stress (Table IV) and then using this failure stress (cT),a material density (p), and a conservative estimate of the peak wave speeds (w~) (-112 seismic velocity), the peak particle velocity (VP) can be 9
If a 300-m radius is assumed, which is the maximum radius for a self-sustaining reaction near the container, and a repository depth of -300 m, then the power is -150 kW. 10 In using this seating method, we do not mean to imply that we are now endorsing the nuclear explosion hypothesis (i.e., from a massive number of nuclear chain reactions in microseconds), which was discounted in Section 5.1.3. Rather, the scahg method allows us to use empirical data on explosive damage in tuff and demonstrates, regardless of probability, the low consequences of a small nuclear chain reaction ("critical excursion") whose energy output, inherently limited by the natural environment, is "miraculously" converted into kinetic energy rather than heat energy. (Crawford et al., 1974) yields an estimate of the radius of the failed material. For intact salt, it is -1.3 m, as found using equation 5. For intact tuff, the radius is less than 0.5 m; for already disturbed tuff, it is 0.8 mboth less than the 0.9 radius of the container. where R, or RT = radius (m) for salt or tuff, respectively, E = yield (J), and VP = peak particle velocity (m/s).
DISCUSSION
Because the bounding probability of a critical event for all but the explosive assembly was greater than 104, we can say only that a criticality event is not easily dismissed through simple logical arguments. This situation occurs because the sequence of events (primary components of a fault or event tree) for a geologic disposal system is usually composed of complex natural processes. Evaluating the probabilistic effect of a natural process is difficult because, while the probability of a natural process oecurnng may be high (e.g., corrosion), whether it will induce adverse conditions that' promote a critical condition is not easy to discern. Furthermore, the probability of natural processes occurring will change with time (e.g., climate change). Finally, the probability of a criticality changes spatially. Hence, the probabilities from the fault tree are both time and spatially dependent. These difficulties with the fault tree methodology were also noted for other aspects of probabilistic simulations of a repository in the late 1970s (Campbell et al., 1978) and explain why complex event and fault trees have not traditionally been used for performance assessments (Rechard, 1995a) and, instead, are used primarily for organizing thoughts.
Consequently, in Rechard ( 1995b) , an effort was made to explore the underlying processes leading up to conditions that may be conducive to a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. In this manner, we could obtain a sense of the probability of a critical mass assembly indirectly by modeling phenomena relevant to the processes of assembly and then observing whether conditions conducive to a self-sustained nuclear chain reaction occurred. Given the design of the container, a critical condition can occur after disposal only if, first, the container (and any other protective layer such m cladding) corrodes and, then, either the boron is leached from the container, or the fissile material goes into solution and is transported from the vicinity of the boron. In the latter case, the fissile material must then be reconcentrated into a shape and mass to promote a sustained nuclear chain reaction. A mechanism to reconcentrate a purified fissile material is particularly difficult to envision, but only detailed modeling can provide an answer.
A possible drawback, however, of a detailed artalysis of the alteration process of the container and fuel, and the amount of fissile material necessary to be assembled together, is that arguments are not succinctfully comprehending such a detailed analysis requires a full understanding of the complex models used. In this regard, bounding calculations on the probability and consequences of a criticality as presented herein are useful because the arguments can be comprehended by a wider audience, although the argument is, perhaps, less definitive. In this study, the calculated bounding consequences are particularly useful in pointing out the small amount of fissions generated from critical events over a million years (-l&8 fissions) in relation to the amount of fissions already represented by the spent nuclear fuel itself (between 1030 and 1031 fissions). In short, concerns about a criticality on the surface where humans can be exposed either directly from the event or indirectly from cleaning up contaminated material do not apply to conditions in a deep, closed, geologic repository.
APPENDIX A: CONCEPTSOF CRITICALITYAND RELATED TERMINOLOGY
To properly understand the results of these boundary calculations, which is that the consequence of a criticality occurring in an underground repository of radioactive waste is low, it is important to understand the concept of a critical condition. The following is a discussion of basic principles of a nuclear chain reaction based upon the discussion in Harper (1961, p. 5-9) .
A.1 Nuclear Chain Reaction
Fission (splitting of atoms) of the nucleus of fis-235U) may occur when the fissionable material (e.g., sionable material absorbs a neutron. For example, after 235U will usually (-5 out of 6 absorbing a neutron, times) split into other elements of unequal mass. In a fission reaction, more neutrons ye emitted than are required to start it (e.g., fission of 2.~5Ureleases between 2 and 3 neutrons). If loss of neutrons is not too great, a chain reaction can build up. Loss of neutrons takes two forms:
(1) loss of neutrons from the system and~) soWtion of neutrons by fissile material without the p~oduction of fission and sorption of neutrons by other material (Fig. A-1 ) . In a small piece of fissionable material, one stray neutron will not start a nuclear chain reaction, even if a nucleus is fissioned, because the neutrons emitted by this initial fission will likely escape before starting another fission. In a larger piece of fissionable material, neutrons would have less chance of escape, and in an infinite block they could never escape (they could be lost-only to sorption by elements that do not fission). With no loss of neutrons at all, and more than one neutron liberated per fission, the rate of fission increases until a change in physical conditions imposes a limit.
A.2 Multiplication Factor
As discussed above, in a large block of fissile mate-235U), a nuclear chain reaction can occur rial (such as whereby some of the original neutrons will produce secc,nd-generation neutrons, some third, a few fourth, and so on. Ultimately, atlowing for all the generations, there may be many more fissions produced than neutrons initially present. To be precise, if n "stray" neutrons are introduced into the fissile material initially, and there are lm in the second generation, there will be k% in the third, I&n in the fourth, and so on. In all, the total number of neutrons that would appear due to n initial neutrons is given by total number of neutrons that r=ca would appear = n z kr.
(A-1) r=o If we can measure the neutron population in one neutron generation and again in the next generation, then the ratio of these numbers would be the multiplication factor, k. (In real systems, it is the effective multiplication factor, most commonly denoted as kefl): uhiplication factor (kem)
Number of neutrons in one generation
(A-2) =
Number of neutrons in preceding generation
Because the number of fission neutrons in any generation is proportional to the number of fissions during each generation, then keff corresponds to the ratio of fissions from generation to generation (and hence ratio of power between generations). If the fissile mass is just that size for which k..= 1, any neutron present in one generation will, on average, leave exactly one survivor in the next generation, and so on through the generations (assuming no additional neutron source). Thus any population of neutrons that happens to be present survives indefinitely, the number of neutrons remains constant, and the rate of fission continues unchanged. The assembly (configuration of fissile material) is said to be critical, and in this condition, remains in a steady state irrespective of the size of the initial population of neutrons (n). If fissile material is removed from the block, or kw becomes less th~unity for any other reason (see Section A.4), each generation contains fewer neutrons than the preceding one, thus there is a limit to the total number of fissions and the reaction stops (i.e., if k <1, the sum converges [Equation A-1] and is equal to n/[1 -k]).
Nuclear fission occurs very quickly (-10 nanoseconds for 235U); thus the generations succeed each other swiftly. Unless keff is nearly equal to unity, the fist few terms in the series contribute most of the sum (see Equation A-1), and the corresponding generations of neutxons are born and die in a short interval of time. If the multiplication factor km is less than but not too close to 1.0, spontaneous fissions in the block will give rise to more fissions, but the total number will remain fairly small. Each spontaneous fission, and each arrival of a stray (e.g., cosmic ray) neutron, will provoke activity.
If more fissile material is added so that ken> 1, any activity already present, however small, can multiply indefinitely. As the interval between generations is small, the multiplication is rapid and the activity can rise rapidly. In such circumstances, however, the resultant liberation of heat quickly expands or breaks apart the supercritical mass (negative feedback), reducing ke, below unity, and stopping the reaction before all the fissile material can be used up (see Section A.4). As described in Section 5.1.6.1, skhough kern> 1 is necessary for an atomic explosion, it alone is not sufficient. The rate of assembly must be fast enough to counteract negative feedback for a sufficient amount of time.
A.3 Reflection and Moderation to Promote Critical Conditions
In reactor design, materials are frequently placed around a nuclear reactor core containing the fissile 32 materials to reflect back into the core many. of the neutrons that would otherwise escape. Common reflector materials, which may also be moderators, in a nuclear reactor are graphite, beryllium, water, and natural or depleted uranium (Fig. A-1 ) . Materials (neutron moderators) are also used directly in the reactor core to promote critical conditions by slowing down the highvelocity neutrons from the fission process because in fissile material (a subset of fissionable material, consisting primarily of 235U and 235Pu) slow (thermal) neutrons have a much greater probability of being absorbed by a nucleus. Common neutron moderators in a nuclear reactor are natural ("light") water, "heavy" water (water with significant quantities of the deuterium isotope), and graphite, because the hydrogen and carbon atoms of these materials slow down neutrons effectively through scattering while absorbing few of them (Fig. A-1) .
A.4 System Feedback that Tends to Arrest Critical Conditions
Usually when /ceti>1, the power and temperature (since most of the energy is heat) will rise until negative feedback becomes large enough to reduce the multiplication effects to a subcritical condition. The most important negative feedback from temperature increase are (1) density decrease of fissile material from thermal expansion (which is important for metal systems, in which the neutron leakage from the assembly is increased), (2) thermal expansion of the moderator (which is a major feedback mechanism for dissolved systems in which fewer neutrons are slowed down), and (3) Doppler effects (since broadening of "resonance points" increases the probability that neutrons are absorbed by nucleus without fission). Included in the latter two mechanisms is desaturation of groundwater. If supercfiticdity (ke.> 1) cannot be counteracted by these negative feedback effects, enough heat energy may be produced to melt the fissile material metal (assemblies) or boil the moderator (solutions), or enough heat energy may be converted to kinetic energy to break thẽ ,sembly apti. As is argued in this report, the most likely criticality event is one that corresponds to a negative feedback mechanism in which the water moderator is removed, thus desaturating the porous media from within the remains of the waste container or a nearby fissile material precipitation zone. This is a very effective negative feedback mechanism, because a natural reactor within tuff would likely be at atmospheric pressure and not pressurized.
A.5 System Feedback that Promotes Critical Conditions
It is possible that the components of the system, such as the neutron moderator, can actu~ly cause key to increase momentarily as the power and temperature of the system rise. For example, positive feedback can occur when too much neutron moderator is present in the system that is already at kefl= 1 such that removal of any of the moderator (e.g., boiling) increases keff to above 1. This instability continues until the system configuration changes. As noted in Section 5.1.1 of this report, Oklo natural reactors may have started from an overrnoderated condition.
Those constructing the first atomic bombs flirted with the idea of using positive feedback (autocatalytic "method") to increase kefl from -1 to that needed for an explosion, but never pursued it because the scheme was found to require at least five times more material (and considerably more to achieve efficiency) than that used in other methods. More important, the fissile material could easily go critical prematurely, aborting a nuclear explosion (Serber, 1992) . As noted in Section 5.1.3 of this report, earth scientists strongly criticize the theory that a natural system is able to avoid "premature" assembly to achieve critical conditions and yet attain conditions in which an atomic explosion may occur.
A.6
